Casebook¶
Incident reports for the lab's purple-team operations, written the way a SOC analyst hands off a case: bottom line first, then the verdict, timeline, scope, indicators, response, and what the detection gaps led to.
| Case | Scenario | Headline | Gaps → fixes |
|---|---|---|---|
| CASE-OP001 | Commodity intrusion, 7 stages on one workstation | Defender blocked delivery; 5 of 7 stages alerted, but the malware launch was hidden in a noisy rule | Run-key rule 510150; file monitoring added to the endpoint baseline |
| CASE-OP002 | The same attack, run quietly with built-in tools | A file left the network with no alert, one IP away from a listed address | D1 clustered discovery, D3 Run-key rename; beaconing backlog |
| CASE-OP003 | Valid-credential hop between two workstations | No alert on the hop, but execution on the target was blocked | D2 workstation-to-workstation logon |
How these were run
Each operation was an authorized, assumed-breach emulation in an isolated lab using MITRE Caldera and Kali. Everything was non-destructive: no credential dumping, no real data, and every temporary exception was logged and reversed. Outcomes are scored 🟦 Prevented · 🟩 Alerted · 🟨 Logged-only · 🟥 Missed.